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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
TODD DAVID WILLARD, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
Case No, 890666-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an order dismissing a prosecution 
involving two second degree felonies. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this case under Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-
3(2)(f)(Supp. 1989) and Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3)(a), (Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) {repealed effective July 1, 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err by suppressing the evidence 
discovered during a voluntary consent search? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1988) (amended 
1989). Defendant moved to suppress the evidence prior to trial, 
and Judge Don V. Tibbs denied the motion. After all of the 
evidence had been presented in a bench trial on May 31, 1989, 
defendant renewed his motion, and Judge Tibbs reversed his 
earlier ruling and suppressed the evidence. Judge Tibbs then 
dismissed the prosecution. The State appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 10, 1988, Sevier County sheriff's deputies 
stopped defendant at a roadblock located on the ramp leading onto 
Interstate 70 near Vermillion, Utah (T. 9-10, 17). Deputy 
Roberts asked for and received defendant's driver's license and 
vehicle registration (T. 17). While Deputy Roberts was looking 
at the documents, Deputy Barney instructed her to ask defendant 
if they could search his truck (T-3. 17-19, 32). Both Roberts 
and Barney observed that defendant seemed extremely nervous and 
agitated when Roberts first approached him (T. 18, 23, 32). His 
hands were trembling and he appeared frightened (T-3. 24). His 
movements were very quick and he "almost looked like a cornered 
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animal" (T-3. 32). Barney thought defendant appeared more 
nervous than the average citizen stopped at a roadblock (T-3, 
39). 
Deputy Roberts asked defendant if he would mind if they 
looked through his vehicle (T-3. 19, 28, 40). Defendant 
responded to the effect that it was all right with him (T-3. 20, 
25, 28, 40-41). Defendant and Barney stepped to the back of the 
truck and Barney asked defendant to unlock it (T-3. 34). While 
defendant was unlocking the back of the truck, Barney asked if 
there were any firearms inside (T-3. 34). Defendant said, "Yes. 
I'll get them. They're at the front." (T-3. 34). Barney said 
"no" that he would get the firearms. Defendant appeared very 
nervous and agitated at this time — according to another 
officer, he was "wired" (T-3. 49). Defendant and Barney both 
went to the front of the truck where defendant reached through 
the window separating the cab from the sleeper and retrieved a 
gun and a kni^ fe (T-3. 34, 44). Barney grabbed defendant's wrists 
and another officer took the weapons (T-3. 34, 49). The gun was 
loaded, and Deputy Barney decided to search the rest of the truck 
(T-3. 34, 50). 
The officers asked defendant, who was not immediately 
handcuffed, to stand away from the truck several times during the 
ensuing search (T-3. 35, 43, 50). He never asked the officers to 
stop searching (T-3. 41). At one point he attempted to grab the 
loaded gun that had been placed on the tailgate of the truck 
after the officers took it away from him (T-3. 43, 50). Inside 
the truck the officers found a total of five firearms and a 
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backpack containing two plastic bags of cocaine (T-3. 35, 45-46, 
51). When Deputy Barney pulled the backpack out of the truck, 
defendant became upset and grabbed at the contents of the pack, 
ripping the plastic bag (T-3. 36). 
Defendant denied that the officers asked for permission 
to search his vehicle or that he gave them permission (T-3. 56-
57). He also claimed that the officers asked him to retrieve the 
guns that were located in the sleeper portion of the truck (T-3. 
59, 61, 70). Judge Tibbs found that defendant consented to the 
search but ruled that the consent did not authorize the search 
because defendant should have been allowed to leave before he was 
asked for consent (T-3. 74-75). Judge Tibbs suppressed the 
evidence under the federal and state constitutions (T-3. 75), and 
dismissed the case (R. 78). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Tibbs suppressed evidence that was discovered 
during a voluntary consent search. There was no evidence that 
the consent was coerced by the brief detention required to ask 
for the consent. Absent a finding that defendant granted consent 
because of an illegal stop or detention, the evidence should have 
been admitted under the state and federal constitutions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS 
TRUCK, AND THE EVIDENCE DISCOVERED DURING THE 
SEARCH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
After a hearing on a pretrial motion to suppress, Judge 
Tibbs ruled that the cocaine discovered in defendant's truck 
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during a consent search was admissible. After the evidence was 
admitted at trial. Judge Tibbs changed his ruling. Although the 
judge found that defendant had consented to the search (R. 73), 
he went on to suppress the evidence because "[t]he detention of 
the defendant after the purpose of the roadblock in checking 
licenses and registrations was satisfied was unreasonable and 
unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions." The 
judge also apparently found that the roadblock was 
unconstitutional because: "[t]he roadblock was not based on a 
Utah statute, or written policy and was nothing more than a 
officous [sic] gentlemen's agreement" (R. 73). Judge Tibbs 
stated that the fact that defendant consented was "moot" (T-3. 
74). He added that consent did not make any difference because 
defendant should have been allowed to go on his way (T-3. 74-75). 
On appeal of a suppression ruling, this Court applies a 
correction of error standard to the trial court's conclusions of 
law. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1989) (citing Oates v. Chavez, 749 
P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988)). Judge Tibbs' ruling was erroneous in 
two respects. First, defendant's consent rendered the cocaine 
admissible regardless of the constitutionality of the roadblock. 
In State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, 
P.2d (Utah 1989), and State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), this Court held that evidence discovered after an 
individual voluntarily consents to a search is admissible under 
the federal constitution regardless of whether the initial stop 
or detention of that individual was constitutional, unless the 
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individual is coerced to grant consent by the initial illegality. 
Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980. In the instant 
case, defendant consented to the search of his vehicle. There is 
no evidence, nor is there a finding, that the consent was coerced 
by either the roadblock stop or by the brief detention caused by 
the officer asking for defendant's consent. Therefore, the 
evidence should not have been suppressed under the federal 
constitution. See also United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 
976 (10th Cir. 1989) (brief detention of defendant to wait for 
backup and to request consent after NCIC check revealed no 
criminal conduct was reasonable and did not invalidate the 
subsequent consent). 
In a case very similar to this one, United States v. 
Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 484 
U.S. 822 (1987), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
admission of cocaine discovered in a consent search conducted 
after a roadblock stop to check licenses and registrations. The 
NCIC computer did not list the Diaz-Albertini vehicle as stolen. 
The state police officer returned after the NCIC check and 
requested permission to search the car. Permission was granted 
and cocaine was discovered. The Tenth Circuit upheld the 
roadblock and further held that a warrantless search is 
reasonable when the party in control of a vehicle consents. Id. 
at 658. The court went on to say that the brief interval 
required to ask for consent to search did not amount to coercive 
detention that would invalidate the consent. Id. at 659. 
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Judge Tibbs' ruling in this case is unclear because it 
seems to say both that the initial stop was valid, but its 
validity had dissipated because its purpose had been fulfilled, 
and that the initial stop was invalid. Despite this lack of 
clarity, and regardless of which way this Court views Judge 
Tibbs' ruling, the result should be admission of the evidence. 
The critical factor in this case is defendant's consent. Under 
the federal case law, the validity of the initial stop was 
irrelevant unless the illegality coerced the defendant into 
granting his consent. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980. Thus, this Court 
need not consider the validity of the initial stop and may even 
assume that it was unconstitutional, and still reverse the lower 
court's decision. 
Even though Judge Tibbs found that the purpose of the 
roadblock in this case had been fulfilled before Officer Roberts 
asked to search, he should not have suppressed the evidence under 
the federal constitution. There were no facts presented that 
indicate that defendant was coerced to grant his consent by the 
continued, brief detention. There was no finding of coercion. 
Judge Tibbs ruled that the continued detention after the driver's 
license and registration check to ask for consent to search 
invalidated the consent even without finding any element of 
coercion. This ruling was erroneous under Walraven and Diaz-
Albertini. 
Second, Judge Tibbs' suppression of the evidence on the 
basis of the Utah Constitution was similarly unfounded. He did 
not apply any different standard under the Utah Constitution when 
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evaluating the reasonableness of the search than he applied under 
the federal constitution. Neither defendant nor the State argued 
that there was any different standard under article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. Defendant's memorandum cites only to 
federal cases or to Utah cases applying federal standards (R. 50-
54). The court's order implies that the Utah and federal 
standards are the same. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied federal 
standards when faced with a suppression issue. State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327, n. 2 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d 
(1989). See, e.g., State v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P.2d 
844 (1968); State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 
(1968); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976); State v. Banks, 
720 P.2d 1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 
389-92 (Utah 1986). Unless the State or a defendant argues that 
the Utah Constitution demands a different standard of 
reasonableness for searches and seizures under article I, section 
14 than that afforded under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, there is no basis for application of a 
different standard. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508, n. 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 
The federal case law provides an acceptable approach 
that was followed by this Court in Arroyo and Sierra and which 
should be adopted under the state constitution as well. This 
Court should reverse the lower court's suppression order because 
it is erroneous under that standard. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to reverse the order of the lower court suppressing the evidence 
and the order dismissing this case. The State further requests 
that the case be remanded for determination of defendant's guilt 
or innocence and entry of an appropriate judgment. 
DATED this f day of April, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^^^l^^M^L 
SANDRA L./S>tfG 
Assistanfr<Att(o'rneV General 
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